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The Steelworkers at Wheeling-Pitt 
*An Interview with Paul Rusen, 
former USWA District Director 
One way to judge a labor contract is from the number and intensity 
of the howls it generates on Wall Street. By that standard, the 
Steelworkers' hard-won agreement with Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel 
Co. in October 1985 should win a prize. 
One of the Street's most respected steel analysts, John C. 
Tbmazos, for example, was moved to panic in his December 1985 
investors' newsletter. T\imazos warned that the Steelworkers 
"could virtually disenfranchise shareholders" in their ruthless 
pursuit of management rights. Citing one dangerous precedent 
after another, Tlimazos concluded that "in the Wheeling-Pittsburgh 
settlement the USWA made virtually no economic concessions and 
assumed management control." 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., Wheeling-Pitt's main banker, 
felt much the same way. Bemoaning management's capitulation 
to the union, the bank threatened to force the company into 
liquidation unless it got a better deal. 
To striking Wheeling-Pitt steelworkers, however, the contract 
they won after a valiant 98-day strike was clearly nothing to cheer 
about. In an attempt to save an already bankrupt company, they 
gave plenty of economic concessions: about $1.40-an-hour in 
wages that were already below the industry standard, the elimina-
tion of COLA and Sunday premiums, and various concessions on 
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vacations, holidays and health insurance. When you add up the 
result of a series of concessions contracts beginning in April 1982, 
steelworkers at Wheeling-Pitt have seen their real standard of 
living decline by some 20%. 
But business leaders had their reasons to fear the precedents 
the USWA established at Wheeling-Pitt. While giving up a bundle 
in economic concessions, the union shredded a whole series of 
sacred management rights and dramatically increased its role in 
running the company. In the end, the union "fired" Wheeling-
Pitt's top management and had a role in choosing the management 
team with whom it eventually agreed to a contract. 
Wheeling-Pitt, the seventh largest steel company in the U.S., had 
been losing money and facing bankruptcy for several years. Every 
time a financial crisis loomed, management came to the union 
asking for relief, and every time the union gave it. In the Spring 
of 1985, there was a new crisis and the USWA negotiating team 
tentatively agreed to a new round of concessions. But this time 
the union insisted that everybody make sacrifices, not just the 
union, and pointed particularly to the banks and insurance 
companies to whom W-P owed so much money. The lenders, in 
fact, had been in the driver's seat. Though they would lose plenty 
if Wheeling-Pitt went under, they insisted they would give no 
economic relief to the company unless their interests were 
completely protected. Knowing that the company would be forced 
into Chapter 11 bankruptcy without a reduced labor contract, 
union negotiators refused to sign the tentative agreement because 
they didn't like the deal management had cut with the lenders. 
Wheeling-Pitt CEO Dennis J. Carney and Labor Relations Vice 
President Joseph Scalise went wild. Management's financial 
arrangements with its lenders were none of the union's business. 
Never before had a labor contract been rejected on such grounds. 
The company declared bankruptcy, went into Chapter 11 and 
found a bankruptcy judge (the infamous Warren W. Bentz) who 
allowed it to void its labor contract, despite a 1984 amendment 
to bankruptcy law that forbid this. Carney and Scalise then 
imposed wage cuts, scrapped the grievance procedure and 
announced a whole series of work rule changes. In response, in 
July 1985 the Steelworkers walked out. 
For the first time in 26 years, the USWA was on strike against 
a steel company. And its main demand was the elimination of 
Dennis J. Carney and his replacement by someone who would 
bargain with the union. 
The union fought on a number of different fronts. The strike 
shut down production completely, putting the financial squeeze 
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on a company that was already sliding toward the precipice that 
leads from Chapter 11 to outright liquidation. It also fought in the 
courts. In addition to appealing Judge Bentz' peculiar under-
standing of bankruptcy law (which was eventually reversed), the 
union went to bankruptcy court to press its members' claims in 
the event of liquidation. Union members held $35 million of 
preferred stock (granted in exchange for earlier concessions), and 
it claimed additional millions in past concessions. As Business 
Week (8-5-85) pointed out, "both the preferred stock and any 
unsecured wage claims approved by the court would be paid 
before common shareholders—including Allen E. Paulson. . . who 
owns 34% of W-P common." 
As one of the company's creditors, union members had a lever 
in the bankruptcy proceedings that neither the shareholders nor 
the banks could ignore. To get rid of Carney and his regime, the 
union had to change the company's Board of Directors, the 
majority of whom supported Carney. The main action here was 
the alliance the union formed with Mr. Paulson and with the 
director representing Japan's Nisshin Steel Co.; together Paulson 
and Nisshin owned 44% of Wheeling-Pitt's common stock, and 
both had long-standing disagreements with Carney's management 
of the company. 
Allying with Carney's opposition on the board, the union went 
after Carney's board allies. One of them, Robert E. Seymour, was 
chairman of Pittsburgh Brewing Co., which makes Iron City beer, 
a Pittsburgh-area favorite among blue-collar workers. While never 
officially initiating a boycott of Iron City, the union informed union 
workers of Mr. Seymour's views and a spontaneous boycott 
emerged with unprecedented speed and comprehensiveness. 
Some steeltown tavern owners refused to serve the beer and 
removed all Iron City advertising paraphernalia from their 
windows and bars. 
On September 20, 1985—60 days into the strike—Dennis Carney, 
Joseph Scalise and one other W-P vice president resigned. So did 
three of Carney's allies on the board of directors, including Mr. 
Seymour. Paulson now had a majority on the board, and he named 
a new CEO, George A. Ferris, who the USWA felt had a better 
attitude toward unions than Mr. Carney had displayed. 
This, above all, is what set Wall Street to howling, and it must 
have sent a chill down the back of every anti-union manager in 
the country: The union had actually succeeded in firing the 
management who opposed it. 
But, having replaced the autocratic and arrogant Carney with 
a new, more "cooperative" management team, the union still had 
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some tough bargaining to do. It had always been willing to give 
economic concessions. But it was done with leaving management 
to managers. Steelworkers wanted a continuing role in how the 
company was run. The strike continued another month before a 
new agreement was reached. 
The final agreement was a continuation of the economic disaster 
steelworkers have been experiencing in the 1980s. Besides the 
wage and benefit cuts, the company terminated its pension plan 
and eliminated more than 1,000 jobs by shutting down a steel-
making complex in Monessen, Pa. The union very skillfully used 
the pension plan termination process to reduce the size of the wage 
cut necessary to avoid liquidation of the company and to shift 
employment costs from Wheeling-Pitt to the federal government 
without greatly hurting retired steelworkers. But the contract, 
overall, did nothing to stop the declining standards steelworkers 
have experienced in the last five years. 
It did, however, win a series of management concessions that 
constitute the most comprehensive and systematic encroachment 
on traditional management prerogatives in American labor history. 
Besides two USWA-appointed Directors and complete access to 
financial records, the union won a whole series of management 
rights. The union has equal representation, for example, on a Joint 
Strategic Decision Board, which is purported to be a parallel board 
of directors. It also has equal representation on similar boards at 
the plant and department levels. Thus at every level of the 
corporation, union workers have a role in what have traditionally 
been exclusively management decisions. 
If unions are to combat the mismanagement that is undermining 
jobs and standards, they will have to engage in activities like those 
of the Steelworkers at Wheeling-Pitt. To find out more about these 
activities, Labor Research Review interviewed Paul Rusen, former 
USWA District 23 Director who headed up the negotiating team 
that created the co-management program at Wheeling-Pitt. 
Rusen comes from a family of coal miners and steelworkers in 
the Wheeling, West Virginia, area. His father was one of those 
UMW coal miners who originally organized the CIO Steelworkers 
in the 1930s and was USWA District 23 Director from 1942 to 
1968. Rusen himself was elected district director in 1977, but at 
the age of 51 retired in 1986. He currently is executive director 
of Employee Ownership, Inc., a consulting firm for labor unions, 
and is one of two USWA-appointed Directors at Wheeling-Pitt. 
—Jack Metzgar 
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Steelworkers demonstrate in downtown Pittsburgh during Wheeling-
Pitt strike. USWA Vice-President Leon Lynch (center) marches arm-
in-arm with District 23 Director Paul Rusen (left) and District 15 
Director Andrew Palm (right). 
LRR: As we understand it, the union deliberately forced 
Wheeling-Pitt into Chapter 11 bankruptcy something most unions 
try to avoid like the plague? Why did you do that? 
Rusen: Let me clarify the record. It was reported in the press and 
claimed by Wheeling-Pittsburgh that we forced them into 
bankruptcy but I think the record is quite clear that the only 
people that can file bankruptcy are the board of directors of 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel. And the action by the board was 
brought about by the ineptness of their chairman, Dennis Carney, 
in not believing us that we were quite serious that there had to 
be a restructuring of the debt of Wheeling-Pitt, that our members 
were not paying the full burden of the company's financial 
problems. 
We took a position very early in the negotiations that nearly $450 
million worth of debt would have to be restructured so that the 
banks were paying their share of the burden—through a stretch-
out of the debt, reduction of interest rates, and forgiveness of some 
of the payments that were due. Avoiding bankruptcy is a normal 
thing that unions like to do. But it became our judgment at 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh that if there wasn't a restructuring of the 
debt, due to falling steel prices they would end up in a liquidation 
situation anyhow. 
LRR: Were there advantages for the union to being in bankruptcy 
once the company was in it? 
Rusen: Once the company was in bankruptcy, we became a player 
of equal status with everybody else. We were one of the big players 
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on the Unsecured Creditors Committee. That gave us a lot of 
bargaining position with the unsecured creditors, the banks and 
the bondholders of the company. It put us in a position in the 
bargaining that we could insist that the labor agreement would 
terminate at the time the reorganization was filed and, therefore, 
we could be a player in that game. 
LRR: Through their stock ownership and through past contract 
concessions, union members had a financial claim as a creditor 
in the bankruptcy proceedings. How important was this financial-
legal front and how important was the strike in ousting Carney 
and winning the contract? 
Rusen: The stock-ownership program placed the Steelworker 
membership in a position that they had nearly $32 million worth 
of preferred stock in the company and a claim on the profit-sharing 
program for another $40 million or more. That, therefore, placed 
us in a position that we are one of the major creditors in the 
Unsecured Creditors Committee. That gave us tremendous voice 
as far as the legal front was concerned. But Dennis Carney would 
not have been ousted without the strike. 
LRR: Led by Manufacturer's Hanover, the company's lenders kept 
threatening to force the company into liquidation. How real was 
that threat, both before the October contract and after? 
Rusen: It was our position, and still is our position, that a 
liquidation was not a real threat. We looked at it from the position 
that if the banks forced liquidation, they would have received a 
liquidation value on the company that would have been far below 
their holdings of unsecured claims and the bondholders' claims. 
There was nearly $450 million worth of claims out there, and a 
liquidation, where you sell this company off a piece at a time, if 
they could have realized $100 million out of that, they would have 
taken a very bad beating. 
The bondholders are in a situation that if this company 
reorganizes, their equity in the company will continue, and the 
unsecured creditors should have a major piece of equity as well. 
Therefore, they have an opportunity to regain their principal 
investment—probably not their interest loss, but they will not take 
the financial beating they would have in a liquidation. 
LRR: So, basically they were bluffing. 
Rusen: I think that was true. Now, if the strike would have run 
beyond the point where the company would have run out of cash 
in late 1985, there possibly could have been a liquidation. But the 
move by Allen Paulsen and the Japanese to force the resignation 
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of the board of directors and Mr. Carney allowed the company 
to get a hold of the situation and start the reorganization process. 
LRR: What would liquidation have meant for Wheeling-Pitt 
workers? Would some of the mills have survived liquidation? 
Rusen: If there had been a liquidation, there would have been 
several of the facilities that would have survived. And I think the 
Steelworkers' bargaining position was sufficiently strong that, for 
example, the Steubenville facility would be there and still 
operating—and most likely, the Yorkville, Martin's Ferry and 
Allenport facilities. The ones that would have been in danger 
would have been Beech Bottom and Monessen. Monessen has 
fallen by the road anyhow. Those facilities that were competing 
in the weaker markets would have been liquidated and probably 
never reopened. 
LRR: And, although it might have been difficult, the surviving 
mills would have stayed union? 
Rusen: Well, this is the Ohio Valley. I don't think that anybody 
would have come in here and tried to operate those facilities 
without a union. I think it was clearly demonstrated during the 
strike that we had a fair handle on what was going on. 
LRR: The way you bargained the termination of the pension plan 
has attracted a lot of attention. How did that work? How were 
you able to reduce the size of the workers' actual concessions 
through the termination of the pension? 
Rusen: Number one, we did not bargain the termination of the 
pension plan. The banks filed a petition, about two or three weeks 
prior to the settlement, insisting on the termination of the pension 
program because of a $50 million annual payment that was due; 
the banks said this company could not, under any circumstance, 
reorganize with that kind of burden. Of course, they would rather 
have the $50 million in their pockets rather than the people in 
the pension fund. They'd rather dump it on the Pension Benefit 
Guarantee Corp (the PBGC). 
The effect of it was that it was some $2.50 an hour that the 
Pension Guarantee Corp. was forced to eat because of the banks' 
action. That allowed us to reduce the pension cost to $ 1.05 an hour. 
LRR: How did the termination affect retirees and current W-P 
workers? Who lost what? 
Rusen: The termination was a very short-term, emotional 
situation to people who suffered a short-term interruption of 
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benefits. But by establishing a voluntary program (V.I.B.A.) that 
the company contributes to, 95% of the benefits are being paid 
to those people who lost money. So, short term it was a traumatic 
experience. Long term, no real significant losses. 
LRR: All of this is pretty fancy financial stuff, which most unions 
haven't had a lot of experience with. How important was Lazard 
Freres as a financial consultant to the union in all this? Do you 
see any dangers in unions' employing investment banking firms 
that are usually on the other side of the table? 
Rusen: Investment bankers are like attorneys. They're for hire. 
They're a hired gun, and they will represent their client to the 
best of their ability in the situation they're involved in at that 
moment. 
The use of Lazard-Freres, and particularly David Spino, as a 
financial consultant in this was extremely important in our 
presentation of the case before Judge Bentz, and in the final 
reversal of that case in federal court, when the appeals court 
reversed Wheeling-Pitt's right to terminate our labor contract. 
They also brought to the table a good insight as to what to expect 
from the financial world—the banks, insurance companies and 
bondholders—in this situation. They brought us realistic numbers 
about the overall picture in the steel industry and what they 
thought the company could afford to pay. I thought their services 
were valuable, but as I say, they were a hired gun. 
LRR: How involved was the rank-and-file in giving direction to 
the union bargaining strategy? Were they pushing for management 
rights, for example? Were they well-informed on all these compli-
cated legal and financial issues? 
Rusen: It became my pattern in this thing—and it dragged out 
nearly 14 months—that we attempted to communicate by direct 
mail to the membership on a regular basis. In the early days, it 
was maybe once a month, but once the labor dispute started, we 
were communicating on almost a weekly basis. We also took 
advantage of a company that would not talk to the news media, 
and we talked to the media on a very regular basis. We held regular 
press conferences. We ran ads in the local papers and in the Wall 
Street Journal—'the bankers won't budge" and some of those kind 
of ads. We did what I call a full-blown public relations campaign 
completely through the strike. 
The negotiating committee, which was made up of the 19 local 
union presidents, met on a regular basis—sometimes, in the early 
part of it, on a weekly basis—and, as we progressed into a labor 
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the Plants & Mills of 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh 
dispute, there were times we were living together seven days a 
week. They were brought up to speed on what was going on on 
a daily basis, and any changes in the format of negotiations, any 
changes in the financial situation of the company. We met with 
the committee on a regular basis, and it probably was the most 
well-informed committee that ever sat in negotiations. 
LRR: But where did the idea of going after all this management 
rights stuff come from? 
Rusen: I think the concept of that started in the 1982 negotiations, 
when I conceived the idea that if we had to make concessions to 
keep this company alive, we were going to have to have some voice 
in the management of the company, plus some ownership in the 
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company. So in April of '82 we installed the stock ownership 
program, and put in the labor-management participation teams 
(LMFEs). The frustration of that (the LMFR) was that it was looked 
on by management as a program that was to work on the shopfloor 
of the plants, but the upper and top management of the company 
were not participants in it. They still made their decisions without 
any real participation from the union. 
So as we moved through the December '82 negotiations, we tried 
to strengthen that participation and one of the things that I clearly 
said quite early to the negotiating committee is that we're going 
to have a program in place that is mandatory on the company, 
that will give us an honest representation in all levels of this 
company from the boardroom to the floor. Basically, it was a 
concept I conceived of, and then it evolved in the committee over 
a period of several years. 
LRR: Concessions at Wheeling-Pitt allowed labor costs there to 
be $5 or $6 an hour below the industry average as of January 1986. 
Didn't that put a lot of pressure on Steelworkers at other 
companies to give concessions also? From the perspective of 
Steelworkers as a whole, might it not have been better to just let 
W-P die rather than to keep the concessions ball rolling? 
Rusen: Well, the $5 or $6 an hour is a debatable figure, but for 
discussion purposes, let's say that's a proper figure. Wheeling-
Pittsburgh paid a very high price for its $18-an-hour total labor 
cost. There are seven major points why other steel companies 
would not want this agreement: 1) Wheeling-Pitt filed bankruptcy, 
which is terribly damaging to the careers of the officers of the 
company; 2) the chairman of the board was forced to resign; 3) 
the board of directors was forced to resign; 4) a union represen-
tative now sits on the board; 5) a cooperative management 
program provides total access to all financial information of the 
company; 6) the company's neutrality in organizing any new plants 
or any non-union existing plants; 7) major concessions on 
contracting out. Add these and all the other goodies of that agree-
ment, and I guarantee you USX and any of the other big seven 
steel companies would never sign this agreement. 
LRR: Now let's get to the management rights provisions in the 
contract. It's hard to know where to start because there are so 
many unusual arrangements. But it seems to us that the Joint 
Strategic Decision Board (JSDB)—with four management and four 
union representatives—is one of the most pathbreaking. Is this 
really a parallel board of directors? What powers does it have in 
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relation to the actual Board? 
Rusen: Does it perform management functions? To an extent. 
Does it perform the way I want it to? Not yet. It has opened up 
a total flow of information that once upon a time was considered 
privileged and confidential by management. It gives us without 
question, or without any debate, all the economic numbers of the 
company—the price of steel, manhours per ton, information on 
orders, customers, information on everything that is going on 
financially in the plant. 
It has provided an opportunity on a plant level for union 
members to have a say in a lot of things, such as contracting out, 
how we make a product, arranging schedules and changing 
schedules. Through it, people have something to say about their 
daily worklife. 
The top management of Wheeling-Pittsburgh yet has not quite 
accepted that the overall total direction of the company should 
be part of that Joint Strategic Board's decision. Expansions, 
purchase of new facilities, those things are not really being 
discussed in the board the way I think they should be. But overall, 
if it has not accomplished one thing, there is a complete flow of 
information that most companies would say is confidential. 
LRR: What is your role on the Board of Directors? Do a couple 
of union-appointed seats there give workers any real power? 
Rusen: Number one, there's a voice there on any and every issue, 
a voice that brings to that board of directors a perception of what 
workers think and what workers need. We're not anti the 
capitalistic system. We believe this company should be in a 
position to make money. And if there's money made, it ought to 
be shared with the workers of Wheeling-Pittsburgh. There have 
been dozens and dozens of issues—issues I've voted for, issues 
I've voted against. It's been a very open board and I have said 
what's on my mind about any subject. In some situations, I've 
influenced some of the members of the board to vote in my 
direction. Last but not least, it gives me an insight on how 
corporate decisions are made. Some of them are very skillfully 
made, and others, well, you wonder how they make them. 
LRR: How about the plant-level and department-level Joint 
Cooperative Employees Boards (JCEBs)? How are these similar to, 
and different from, "employee involvement" and "quality of 
worklife" committees usually set up by management? 
Rusen: The first thing about the committees is that they're a part 
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of the collective bargaining agreement and they're mandatory on 
both the company and the local union. The union people on the 
boards are selected by the local union officers. They're not selected 
by the management. They are selected on the basis of consensus 
and there are times when there is considerable debate about those 
committees. 
It's not the quality circle thing that looks for just improving 
quality, productivity or efficiency. These committees have the task 
of improving the quality of worklife. And they have certain 
contractual obligations, such as the question of contracting out, 
the question of the leader program, etc. 
LRR: The "leader program." One of the union's goals with the 
JCEBs was to eliminate supervisors by training bargaining unit 
workers to manage their own work. How has that worked thus far? 
Rusen: At the present time, the leader program has been worked 
out by the Joint Strategic Board on the top level. The board 
established goals and criteria for those people who go. into the 
leader program. Presently, there are 29 leaders in place in the 
Steubenville facilities. At Yorkville and Martin's Ferry, there is 
resistance to the program. 
The overall goal is to eliminate the first-line supervisor and put 
in place a leader program where the guy on the floor directs the 
other employees, but yet works with his hands to get the job done. 
This will be done by attrition, not just by going out and firing 
supervisors. 
One of the big arguments in all the years I've been around the 
labor movement is the question of the supervisor out there 
performing bargaining unit work. If you have a leader (a union 
worker) doing the day-to-day duties of a supervisor—directing the 
employee where his assignment is today, getting the parts, making 
sure materials are there to work with and those kind of t h i n g s -
then it frees the supervisor to move up to the next level of 
supervising—no longer hands-on supervising, but actual manage-
ment functions of looking at a whole department instead of looking 
at a small crew. 
LRR: Is it too much to say that the object of the program is to 
bring the foreman position into the union? 
Rusen: That is exactly what the program is all about. 
LRR: Other union goals were to reduce excessive use of overtime 
and contracting out. Have the JCEBs been effective in those areas? 
Rusen: The contracting out program has been exceptionally 
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functional. For example, in 
Steubenville, when they were 
rebuilding the ovens up there, 
the caster work and all the day-
to-day maintenance work that 
was being farmed out is now 
being looked at on a competitive 
basis. On the basis of the contract 
language: Can we perform this 
work? Do we have the tools and 
equipment to perform this work? 
Can we do it better and cheaper 
than outside contractors? The 
final answer is that we have 
brought a great many of our 
trades and crafts people back to 
work. They're not on lay-off, like 
you'll find in the rest of the 
industry. Overall, the contracting 
out thing has been very successful. 
The elimination of overtime? I won't say that has been as 
successful as I hoped it would be. One of the things that came 
out of the elimination of jobs is that the company is very thin on 
maintenance people and a lot of downturn maintenance is being 
performed on an overtime basis which is excessive in my opinion. 
And we haven't found an answer to that problem yet. 
I would rate the contracting out thing as probably about 90% 
successful and the elimination of overtime about 50% successful. 
LRR: One provision in the contract, the "Price Escalation Bonus," 
obligated the company to pay up to one dollar-an-hour in bonuses 
if steel prices increased. Why did you tie wages to prices in this 
way? Has it yielded any bonuses yet? 
Rusen: It has not yielded any bonuses yet because that program 
didn't go into effect until January 1 of this year (1987). There were 
price increases in steel that stuck in January, but we don't know 
where the price of steel is going at this point. 
We looked at the steel industry and we were looking for 
something different, and I won't say this is the answer to the 
problem. But trying to tie an escalator clause to profits in the steel 
industry, with the deterioration of profits in the industry, it was 
almost impossible. If you try to tie it to cash flow, this is a very 
fluctuating number that is hard to do. So the experiment is to tie 
it to price increases. Will it work? I really don't know, but it was 
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going at it from a different direction, looking for a new way to 
tie into the improved financial position of the company. If prices 
increase, that means cash improves and that means our people 
will share. 
LRR: The contract is set up to expire 10 days after the company 
comes out of Chapter 11, which was done to give the union a role 
in the company's reorganization plan. Does that seem to be 
working? Has the union been participating fully in reorganization 
planning, including potential arrangements with the bankers and 
other creditors? 
Rusen: Number one, in the bankruptcy the union is totally aware 
of anything that goes on in the courts that affects the bankruptcy. 
And, next month I will be sitting in a three-day board meeting 
where we will have an opportunity to say to the operations people 
that we think you ought to do A and B, etc., in this reorganiza-
tion. That gives us participation in it from that point-of-view. 
Number two, by being in a position that the contract terminates 
10 days after a reorganization is in place, the secured creditors, 
the unsecured creditors, the priority claims—all these people know 
that nothing they agree to is worth a damn unless we agree to 
it. Because without a labor contract, they cannot pay out the 
money that would be necessary for the restructuring of this 
company. 
LRR: Overall, how would you rate Wheeling-Pitt's chances of 
surviving Chapter 11? 
Rusen: I think that, provided we can solve the problems with the 
Internal Revenue and the Pension Guarantee Corp., this company 
will restructure and come out of the bankruptcy and be one of 
the viable and competitive companies in the steel industry. 
It's a modern company, it has good facilities, and we've been 
working on a game plan to upgrade the existing finishing facilities 
of the company. We are looking at downstreaming this company 
to produce certain products by acquisitions of other companies—in 
a way that will not cost us jobs in the existing company. 
I think that if we can continue on the program and if reasonable 
economic growth continues in this country, Wheeling- Pittsburgh 
is going to be one of the four or five steel companies that survive. 
LRR: Has the union's role in management increased the chances 
of the company surviving? 
Rusen: Oh, I think it has drastically increased the company's 
chance of survival. Because we are there participating in the day-
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to-day decisions of how Wheeling-Pitt functions and because we 
have opened up those communications lines, everybody who 
works for this company—from the president to the laborer on the 
blast furnace—understands that we're in a war of survival. And 
I think that has a lot to do with all the production records we're 
breaking right now. 
LRR: Many unionists are skeptical about unions having a role in 
management. They fear that being involved in "running the 
company" will eventually turn the union into a "company 
union"—that workers will be so concerned about the company's 
"competitiveness" that they will lose solidarity with and ignore 
the interests of their union brothers and sisters at other companies. 
Are management rights something the labor movement should be 
pursuing, even where the situation is not so desperate as it was 
at Wheeling-Pitt? 
Rusen: First, there will always need to be a system of justice in 
any workplace, a place where a person can take his gripes and 
bitches to have his day in court. I don't care if you create the most 
liberal labor-management system, there are going to be situations 
where human beings—because of greed, selfishness and those 
things—try to take advantage of people. The labor movement and 
the union inside a company will always provide that opportunity 
for a judicial system. The union also brings to the bargaining table 
ideas about how to share in the wealth. The union will always 
be there for the purpose of providing the person who works on 
the floor in the plant the right to tell the boss, "Go to hell." 
Over the last 40 years of the labor movement, we have been 
attacking management's rights over how they run companies. We 
have questioned how companies schedule employees and we've 
established a system of how people get the jobs by seniority. We've 
slowly chipped away at those fat "management rights" that were 
out there years ago, where if you were the boss' son, you got 
treated better than the poor Italian immigrant. And, over the years, 
we've been infringing upon those rights. We've created a 
workweek that did away with the bull gangs that used to stand 
in the plant. So, I just see this as a more sophisticated approach 
to what we've been doing for years. • 
